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CHAPTER 2 IN THE HISTORY OF CMBS: COMING TO
TERMS WITH THE NEW RULES
ALAN KRONOVET AND CHRIS VAN HEERDEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the publication of the Note, An Overview of Commercial
Mortgage Backed Securitization (“the 1997 Note”) in Volume 1 of the
North Carolina Banking Institute Journal,1 the securitization market has
increased in its importance as a financing vehicle for a variety of asset
classes. By providing liquidity to otherwise illiquid debt markets,
securitization links providers of capital with those in need of capital by
aligning the risk appetite of investors with the appropriate risk premium
paid by borrowers.2 In its opening chapter spanning roughly 25 years,
commercial mortgage backed securitization (“CMBS”) has played a
significant role in financing commercial real estate.3 CMBS is now
entering chapter 2 and its role in real estate financing is being shaped by
new regulations and the collective memory of recent major market
disruptions.
This article provides background information on CMBS in Part
II.4 Part III examines three specific market disruptions and their impact
on CMBS over the last twenty years, and also reviews the structural,
economic, and regulatory changes that resulted from those market

* Alan Kronovet is an Executive Vice President and Head of Commercial Mortgage
Servicing for Wells Fargo; B.A., American University; J.D. University of North Carolina
School of Law. Chris van Heerden is a Director and Head of CMBS Research at Wells Fargo
Securities; B.S. Houghton College; J.D. Charlotte School of Law.
1. Alan Kronovet, Note, An Overview of Commercial Mortgage Backed Securitization:
The Devil Is in the Details, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 288 (1997) (written while a law student and
as a founding member of the North Carolina Banking Institute Journal).
2. Georgette Chapman Poindexter, Impossible, Impracticable, or Just Expensive?
Allocation of Expense of Ancillary Risk in the CMBS Market, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 653,
654 (2003) (“The hallmark of the CMBS market is its ability to match risk with return in
pricing mortgage debt.”).
3. Commercial real estate describes income-producing assets most often consisting of
retail, office, multifamily, and hotel properties.
4. See infra Part II.
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disruptions.5 Part IV discusses current market conditions with an eye
towards the future, suggesting that the CMBS market faces the prospect
of reduced growth as a result of regulatory constraints.6 During the
course of the article, some of the concerns initially raised in the 1997
Note are reviewed and evaluated.
II. BACKGROUND ON CMBS
CMBS was the disruptive technology of real estate financing in
the 1990s, transforming what had largely been a private balance sheet
approach to lending by introducing an alternative source of funding tied
to publicly traded securities. For borrowers, the arrival of CMBS meant
greater efficiency in the lending process, more competition on pricing
between lenders, the standardization of loan terms and documents, and
financing terms that became untethered from lenders’ balance sheet
needs.
To be clear, financing real estate by issuing bonds was not
original to CMBS, securitized mortgages having been preceded by
property bonds of the 1920s and 1930s and industrial revenue bonds of
the 1970s and 1980s. CMBS stands apart from these, however, because,
by tranching property cash flow, securitizations created bonds with
payment profiles that differed meaningfully from the underlying
mortgages in terms of tenure and risk profile. Tradable bonds tied to
commercial real estate with cash flows tailored to investor risk appetite
proved a winning formula.
CMBS grew from relative obscurity in the early 1990s to become
the largest capital source to commercial real estate by 2007. Although
there were experiments with commercial mortgage securitization in the
1980s, it was the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s and the
subsequent liquidation of the assets of insolvent thrifts by the Resolution
Trust Corporation (“RTC”) starting in 1991 that moved the CMBS
business to a critical mass in terms of market participation and
infrastructure investments.7 Large asset sales brought about investments
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. In the wake of the savings and loan crisis, the RTC, established to serve as a

conservator and receiver of insolvent thrifts, sold off the assets of these institutions, including
commercial mortgages, through securitization. From June 1991 to December 1995, the RTC
closed 27 multifamily and commercial mortgage securitizations. Putting these together with
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in infrastructure to support commercial mortgages securitizations. As the
decade proceeded, CMBS moved from “newcomer” to a major capital
source for commercial real estate, transitioning from securitizing balance
sheet loans from savings and loans, banks, and insurance companies to
largely funding loans that were originated specifically for securitization.
By 2007, roughly a third of the outstanding commercial mortgages in the
U.S. were financed through CMBS loans (Exhibit 1).8
This long run of continued growth came to an end with the 2008
financial crisis. In the immediately following years, it became clear that
leverage had climbed too high and many properties were encumbered by
too much debt. The tightening of credit also proved to have an effect on
real estate values. CMBS investors suffered significant ratings
downgrades and losses.
Exhibit 1: Sources of Commercial Mortgage Capital—Commercial
Mortgage Debt Outstanding by Holder

its single family securitizations, RTC securitizations totaled over $41 billion in assets. George
Alexander and Tom Raburn, FDIC Closes the Books on RTC Securitization Program, CMBS
WORLD (Winter 2005). Other research has also credited advances in computer technology as
playing a role in securitization coming of age in the 1990s. Robert A. Brown, Financial
Reform and the Subsidization of Sophisticated Investors’ Ignorance in Securitization Markets,
7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 105, 121–22 (2010) (citing Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era
in American Finance, in A Primer on Securitization 1, 8 (1996)).
8. In 2007, commercial mortgages outstanding measured $2.37 trillion, of which
$776.81 billion, or 32.7%, was financed through CMBS. This estimate uses the data from
Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1 for non-bank lender holdings and the FDIC’s
Quarterly Loan Performance Indicators Report to calculate bank holdings of commercial and
multifamily loans excluding construction and owner-occupied properties.

70

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 20

The 1997 Note identified access to capital as a primary advantage
of securitization.9 CMBS brought capital to commercial real estate
finance that may not otherwise have been available to commercial real
estate owners. A corollary benefit was that borrowers were able to
receive financing in secondary and tertiary markets for assets of certain
types and qualities that they would not have found as abundant prior to
the development of a CMBS market.10 Moreover, as a result, borrowers
were able to receive higher loan amounts from CMBS lenders creating
more loan leverage for the property collateralizing the loan.
Access to capital proved to be a double-edged sword, however.
Capital markets capital flows are sensitive to market conditions and
opportunities. With CMBS becoming a key funding source, borrowers
became subject to the impact of investors’ other investment options.
When market conditions warrant, CMBS liquidity can evaporate. The
speed with which liquidity dries up creates funding issues for real estate
owners looking for financing reliability.
For the 18 months running up to December 2009, no CMBS
securitizations priced (Exhibit 2).11 A gradual recovery followed with
issuance moving steadily higher to reach $94.6 billion in 2015. Even
with this improvement, the volume of new loans extended has been less
than the volume of loans paying off. As a result, the size of the CMBS
sector continues to contract. At the end of the third quarter of 2015, the
outstanding balance of the CMBS market measured $550.2 billion, based
on Federal Reserve data, down from $776.8 billion in 2007.12

9. Kronovet, supra note 1, at 289.
10. Miguel Segoviano et al., Securitization: Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead 6

(International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 13/255, 2013) (“Securitization can lower
funding costs and economize on capital for financial institutions—benefits that may be passed
along to businesses and consumers.”); Xudong An, et al., Value Creation through
Securitization: Evidence from the CMBS Market, 38 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 302, 303
(2009) (finding that CMBS lowers the cost of funds to borrowers).
11. Late in 2009 three single-borrower securitizations came to market, but no multi-loan
conduit transactions were priced during the entire year. Adam Piore, CMBS 2.0, THE REAL
DEAL (Jan. 1, 2011), http://trdny.com/yBuFBw.
12. Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States,
Flows and Outstandings Third Quarter 2007, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.
(Dec. 6, 2007) (not including multifamily backed deals guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20071206/z1.pdf; Federal Reserve
Statistical Release Z.1, Financial Accounts of the United States, Third Quarter 2015, BD. OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RESERVE
SYS.
(Dec.
10,
2015),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf.
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Exhibit 2: CMBS Issuance Reached $94.6 billion in 2015
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Banks participate in the CMBS market in three ways: as
investors, as loan originators, and as service providers. Investment in
CMBS is common across banks of all sizes. Banks use CMBS as part of
a diversified investment portfolio. On an industry-wide basis, CMBS
made up 5.6% of bank investment portfolios at the end of the third quarter
in 2015. As a separate business, a number of banks originate loans for
sale into securitizations. Fewer banks—19 in total from 2010 to 2015—
operate CMBS loan origination businesses, but these banks are the largest
source of loans for securitization. From 2010 to 2015, banks originated
73% of the loans included in multi-loan, or conduit, CMBS transactions.
Fewer banks still serve as significant service providers to CMBS, acting
as master servicers, certificate administrators, or trustees.13

13. For a description of the roles of CMBS deal parties, see Stewart McQueen et al., An
Investor’s Guide to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, DECHERT LLP 2 (June 2013)
https://www.dechert.com/An_Investors_Guide_to_The_Pooling_and_Servicing_Agreement
_06-04-2013/ (“CMBS transactions use a dual-servicer structure. The master servicer is
generally responsible for servicing performing loans. The special servicer, on the other hand,
is responsible for specially servicing loans that are subject to a servicing transfer event and
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Exhibit 3: Bank Investment Portfolio Composition by Bank Size and
Investment Type

III. MARKET DISRUPTIONS
From the earliest years, crisis moments have served as defining
points in the CMBS market. Three stand out. Early in the CMBS
experience, the 1998 Asian currency crisis and Russian default illustrated
that, through CMBS, bond market turmoil can reverberate back into
commercial property prices. The disruption proved to be short-lived but
deep losses at loan originators prompted new risk management practices.
Growth resumed until three years later when the 9/11 terrorist attacks
caused the destruction of several properties collateralizing CMBS. In the

administering real estate owned (“REO”) properties. The trustee and the certificate
administrator generally perform administrative functions related to the trust and the
certificates. These functions are often performed by the same entity. The trustee functions
generally entail holding the assets of the trust for the benefit of the certificateholders and
exercising certain rights on behalf of the certificateholders.”).
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months following, the sudden scarcity of private sector insurance for
terrorism risk caused significant uncertainty, but in 2002 Congress
intervened with an insurance backstop program, and, with that, CMBS
resumed with record breaking issuance in 2003. The third significant
crisis moment, the 2008 financial crisis, has proved more lasting.
Investor losses have been significant. Many aspects of the CMBS
business have become subject to heightened regulation.
A.

The Asian Contagion, the Russian Flu, and the End of the
Wonder Years

In 1998, the CMBS market met with the first of three large market
disruptions during the past twenty years. The chain of events that started
with the collapse of the Thai Baht in July 1997, the ensuing collapse of
other Asian currencies, culminating in the eventual default by Russia on
its sovereign debt in August 1998, ended the “Wonder Years” in the
CMBS market and CMBS issuance came to a halt.14 This led to a more
risk-averse market followed by a period of renewed, but more measured,
growth.
Fallout from the 1998 market disruption was felt by both CMBS
investors and lenders. CRIIMI Mae, a mortgage real estate investment
trust, was one of the largest buyers of the below-investment grade CMBS
tranches (known as “B-piece”).15 Like other B-piece buyers, CRIIMI
Mae used various strategies over time to achieve a shorter payback period
than the more senior bonds in the respective CMBS transactions such as
relying heavily on financing of their CMBS investments from investment
banks. Amid the market turmoil of late 1998, widening spreads and
declining bond prices left CRIIMI Mae facing margin calls, eventually
causing CRIIMI Mae to file bankruptcy on October 5, 1998.
CRIIMI Mae was not the only casualty of the 1998 market

14. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian Fin. Crisis, NAT’L
BUREAU
OF
ECON.
RESEARCH
(Working
Paper
No.
6680,
1998),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6680.pdf.
15. B-piece buyers are an integral part of the CMBS business. These investors buy the
lowest, riskiest tranches in each CMBS transaction with commiserate risk-based yields and
are awarded with some control over the disposition of defaulted loans. Furthermore, B-piece
buyers are generally thought of by other CMBS investors as gatekeepers for CMBS collateral
because B-piece buyers may remove loans that they view as objectionable from the CMBS
pool of loans during the due diligence period prior to the securitization closing.
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disruption. CMBS lenders and issuers learned that their interest rate
hedging strategies were ineffective against the volatility created by this
disruption. Although CMBS lenders believed that their loans were
properly priced and hedged against such interest volatility, there was not
a strong enough correlation between their interest rate hedges and interest
rate movement. Due to the interest rate dislocation during this period,
many lenders went back to their borrowers on transactions that had not
yet closed and re-priced their loans. This created a wave of tension
between borrowers, who believed in good faith they had binding pricing
for their loans, and CMBS lenders, who could not afford to close loans
with negative value. The disadvantages of the interrelationship between
the capital markets and commercial real estate finance came into clear
focus.
Many CMBS loan originators also relied on short-term financing,
using bank warehouse facilities to borrow against their loans before
selling these loans to securitizations. As the Asian and the Russian crises
unfolded, the value of warehoused loans dropped precipitously. The
decline in value of warehoused loans drove margin calls on these CMBS
lenders. Where lenders did not have the capital necessary to meet the
margin calls, warehouse facility lenders took possession of the loans in
lieu of cash repayment, forcing some of these lenders out of business.
Credit Suisse, Nomura, Merrill Lynch, Daiwa Securities, and WMF
Capital were among the firms with major CMBS loan origination
businesses that stopped originating loans for securitization after suffering
large losses.16
Given this fallout, when the market returned in 1999, the
emphasis was on risk reduction for CMBS lenders. Issuance “velocity”
became a new strategic imperative.17 Through issuance velocity, loan
originators and issuers sought to limit their risk exposure by shortening
the length of time between origination and securitization. To accomplish
this, issuers shifted to smaller pools of loans with multiple loan
originators contributing to the same loan pool in order to more frequently
issue CMBS transactions. Prior to 1998, CMBS lenders generally looked

16. Leah Nathans & Andrew Osterland, Buried in Nomura’s Real Estate Bubble,
BUSINESSWEEK, (Sept. 24, 1998), http://www.businessweek.com/1998/40/b3598083.htm.
17. Michael J. Acton & Michael Ervolini, Evolution of the U.S. Commercial Mortgage
Market
and
Its
Implications
for
CMBS,
CMBS
WORLD
(1999),
http://www.crefc.org/Magazine/CMBS_World_Summer_1999/index.html#/16/.
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to contribute their collateral into a CMBS transaction between two and
four times a year. Once the CMBS markets returned to some normalcy,
lenders looked to include their loans as collateral to CMBS transactions
with much more frequency, perhaps up to eight to ten times per year,
hence the term “velocity”.
B.

9/11

The events of 9/11 affected the CMBS market directly. Four of
the seven World Trade Center buildings were financed with CMBS loans,
as were three nearby properties.18 For bondholders, the then-existing
insurance regime proved sufficient: The $563 million GMAC 2001-WTC
securitization, backed by four World Trade Center complex properties,
experienced no interruptions to cash flow after 9/11 and was repaid in full
out of insurance proceeds in 2003.19 After 9/11, however, the insurance
landscape changed. Property and casualty insurance providers began to
exclude terrorism risk from all-risk policies while stand-alone insurance
for terrorism risk became either unavailable or unaffordable.20 Borrowers
facing higher premiums were placed in conflict with servicers who were
vested with the ability to force-place terrorism insurance to protect
CMBS investors.21
CMBS transaction documents generally mandate that the
borrower maintain comprehensive all-risk insurance from a qualified
provider covering property replacement cost and business interruption.
Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, insurers rarely excluded or separately
18. Buildings 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the World Trade Center were financed through a CMBS
transaction, as were One Liberty Plaza, and 2 and 4 World Financial Center. CMBS Quarterly
Insights: The Shape of CMBS Since Sept. 11, STANDARD & POOR’S STRUCTURED FIN. (Oct.
23, 2001).
19. CMBS Quarterly Insights: Fourth-Quarter 2003, STANDARD & POOR’S (Jan. 29,
2004).
20. Baird Webel, Terrorism Risk Insurance: Issue Analysis and Overview of Current
Program, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV. 1 (Jul. 23, 2014) (“Because of the lack of public data on,
or modeling of, the scope and nature of the terrorism risk, reinsurers felt unable to accurately
price for such risks and largely withdrew from the market for terrorism risk insurance in the
months following September 11, 2001. Once reinsurers stopped offering coverage for
terrorism risk, primary insurers, suffering equally from a lack of public data and models, also
withdrew, or tried to withdraw, from the market.”).
21. Omni Berkshire Corp. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 307 F. Supp. 2d 534 (2004)
(Upholding the ability of Wells Fargo as CMBS master servicer to force-place terrorism
insurance coverage where a borrower had refused to pay the increased cost of a stand-alone
terrorism insurance policy).
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charged for terrorism risk. The subsequent unbundling of terrorism risk
from other property insurance left borrowers choosing between paying
cost-prohibitive premiums or risk defaulting on their loans.22 The
unavailability of terrorism insurance put the extension of new loans on
hold.23
In 2002, Congress passed, and the President signed, the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”) to address the deadlock in terrorism
insurance. Initially set up as a three-year program, TRIA required
insurers to provide terrorism insurance to commercial policyholders and
the program established a public-private loss-sharing arrangement.24
TRIA proved to be a success, and, following its enactment, the
availability of terrorism coverage improved and premium prices
declined.25 In January 2015, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program was
extended for a third time and now runs through 2020.26
Real estate market fundamentals were already weakening before
the 9/11 attacks, reflecting a slowdown in the overall economy and the
deflating dot-com bubble. Hotel defaults rose in the wake of the terrorist
attacks. In the recession that followed, rents moved lower across property
sectors and vacancies moved higher. Office vacancy rates, rose from
8.1% in mid-2000 to 10.8% by mid-2001, and then 12.3% a year later.27
The Federal Reserve responded to economic weakness with
accommodative monetary policy, lowering the target federal funds rate
from 6.50% in December 2000 to 1.00% by June 2003. Economic growth
remained weak during the first part of the recovery, but due to lower
interest rates, commercial real estate prices rebounded ahead of a
recovery in fundamentals. By year-end 2003, the CMBS market was
fully operational and issuance of $77.8 billion for the year reached the
highest on record.

22. Poindexter, supra note 2, at 657.
23. Id. at 660.
24. Baird Webel, Terrorism Risk Insurance: An Overview, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1

(Apr. 11, 2005), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21979.pdf.
25. COMMERCIAL MORTG. SEC. ASS’N, TERRORISM INSURANCE AVAILABILITY FOR
COMMERCIAL
REAL
ESTATE
CAPITAL
MARKETS,
https://www.crefc.org/uploadedFiles/CMSA_Site_Home/Government_Relations/CMSA_Iss
ues/Terrorism_Insurance/Terrorism_Insurance_Position_Paper.pdf
26. Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015, H.R. 26, 114th
Cong. § 101 (2015).
27. Tad Philips & Sally Gordon, What Now? CMBS in 2002, CMSA WORLD 6 (Winter
2002).
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The Great Recession and the Great Regulation

It generally takes a series of events to make a crisis. This series
of events, including the credit expansion of the preceding decade
followed by rising subprime mortgage delinquencies into early 2007,
took on the character of a crisis in the summer of 2007 when two Bear
Stearns Cos. hedge funds heavily invested in subprime mortgage bonds
were liquidated.28 The financial crisis emanated from subprime
mortgages but called into question CMBS valuation and market practices.
Extensive research has followed the financial crisis, and a number of
conclusions apply to CMBS: (1) Many investors operated under some
form of structural reliance on bond ratings, (2) Derivative products,
including Collateralized Debt Obligations (“CDO”) and credit default
swap indices abounded while their ability to artificially reduce the cost of
capital was not well understood, and (3) Principal agent issues existed in
the structuring deals.29
In 2001, U.S. bank regulators revised regulatory capital
standards, for the first time allowing banks to record a lower capital
charge for investment-grade CMBS than for a pool of commercial whole
loans.30 In fact, the risk based capital required for holding a AAA rated
CMBS position was lower than the capital required against a commercial
mortgage by a factor of five. Insurance companies, which operate under
capital rules set by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
similarly faced reduced capital charges against highly rated CMBS
compared to commercial mortgages. Investment mandates at money
market funds and pension funds also had investment restrictions tied to
ratings.31
Regulatory capital favored highly rated securities, and financial
innovation followed.32 CDOs, for example, assembled and re-securitized
28. Kate Kelly et al., Two Big Funds At Bear Stearns Face Shutdown, WALL ST. J. (June
20, 2007), at A1.
29. See Segoviano et al., supra note 10.
30. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines; Capital Maintenance:
Capital Treatment of Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and Residual Interests in Asset
Securitizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 59614 (Nov. 29, 2001).
31. Christian Opp et al., Rating Agencies in the Face of Regulation, BERKELEY J. OF FIN.
ECON. (Oct. 30, 2012) (concluding that, “Since these regulations are of first order relevance
for institutional investors’ capital management, a AAA label is economically valuable,
independently of the underlying information it provides about the risk of a security.”).
32. Darrell Duffe, Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial
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lower-rated junior CMBS bonds, credit default swaps, mezzanine debt,
and miscellaneous assets. Rating models assigned some benefit to the
diversification between the assets, and, thus, the bulk of the CDO
structures achieved AAA rating.33 Structured investment vehicles
(“SIVs”) invested in longer maturity assets and issued highly rated short
maturity paper in the form of asset-backed commercial paper (“ABCP”).
CDOs and SIVs became significant buyers of CMBS. The proliferation
of derivative financial products became a hallmark of the period leading
up to the financial crisis. Investors were able to make directional bets on
CMBS prices through credit default swap indices known as CMBX. 34
The cumulative effect of these derivatives may help explain why the risk
premium on CMBS bonds decreased from 2004 to 2007 even as the risk
inherent in the product increased.35
Bond ratings became more accommodative leading up to the
financial crisis.36 Loan quality declined, evidenced by a rising share of
interest-only loans in CMBS pools and an overall increase in loan
leverage. Even as loan level leverage increased, the loss protection to
achieve a certain rating continued to be lowered by rating agencies from
2004 to 2007.37 More accommodative ratings followed a prolonged
Stability 15 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 255, 2008),
http://www.bis.org/publ/work255.pdf (noting that senior CDO tranches were often sold out).
The fact that a typical CDO structure incorporates multiple classes of relatively senior
tranches that are all sold out is evidence that CDOs were created in response to demand for
certain classes of securities.
33. Anna Barnett-Hart, The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis,
HARV. COLLEGE (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/students/dunlop/2009CDOmeltdown.pdf.
34. Staff Report, Clearinghouse Reveals CMBX Contract Volumes, COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE
DIRECT
(Nov.
13,
2008),
http://www.crenews.com/top_stories_subscriber/clearinghouse-reveals-cmbx-contractvolumes.html (“CMBX contracts totaling $265 billion in gross notional value are outstanding,
and more than half of that is comprised of contracts against super-senior AAA bonds. In
addition, about $10.8 billion of notional value of CMBS credit-default swaps are
outstanding.”).
35. The spread to Treasuries, or risk premium, on newly-issued BBB CMBS bonds, for
example, decreased from 90 bps at the beginning of 2004 to 75 bps in late 2006, even as the
subordination, or loss absorption capacity, of the bonds decreased from 4.93% on average in
2004 to 4.25% in 2006 and underlying loans increasingly consisted of interest-only loans and
overall loan leverage moved higher.
36. The 1997 Note identified the potential investor misunderstanding of the role of rating
agencies as a then existing criticism of CMBS. Kronovet, supra note 1, at 289–90.
37. Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, CMBS Subordination, Ratings Inflation, and the
crisis of 2007-2009 42–43 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16206, 2010)
(“During the crisis, while commercial loans bore their share of defaults, realized defaults were
in line with levels observed over almost the whole of the 40-year period before the crisis,
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period of low defaults and losses in CMBS loans. Exhibit 4 illustrates
the aftermath of ratings inflation. By year-end 2015, losses had wiped
out 71.5% of the original balance of BBB rated CMBS issued in 2006.
Losses will ultimately end up higher still as the remaining loans reach
maturity in 2016.
Exhibit 4: Cumulative Losses by Original Class Rating Conduit CMBS38

CDOs intensified an existing agency problem in the CMBS
market. B-piece buyers, who had been viewed as gatekeepers of loan
quality, were able to sell their holdings into CDOs and realize a profit
upfront, undermining the incentive to perform comprehensive due
diligence.39 The agency problem was not an entirely new development

excluding the most recent few years . . . . [B]oth before and during the crisis, the only
significant shift in the market was the reduction in allowable subordination levels by the rating
agencies. It is possible that these over-optimistic subordination levels were caused by too
much reliance on very recent default data.”).
38. The chart summarizes realized losses as a percentage of original balance by original
rating calculated through year-end 2015.
39. Adam B. Ashcraft et al., Does Skin in the Game Affect Security Performance?
Evidence
from
the
Conduit
CMBS
Market
(Apr.
2014),
http://experiments.cob.calpoly.edu/seminars/RiskRetention_30march2014-1.pdf
(“The
creation of CRE CDOs combined with generous ratings given to these CRE CDOs provided
an exit strategy for B-piece buyers that enabled them to have less exposure to the risk
associated with the underlying loans in conduit/fusion CMBS deals.”); Adam J. Levitin &
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because B-piece buyers have typically recovered the full value of their
investment before more senior bondholders.40 CDO structures, however,
allowed these investors to realize an immediate profit by selling the Bpiece into a CDO concurrent with the CMBS deal pricing.
What had started with a rise in subprime delinquencies became a
credit crunch and then an economic recession. After peaking at over $500
billion in 2007, the transaction volume in commercial dropped to $54.4
billion in 2009. Property prices declined 43.7% from the highs reached
in Oct. 2007 to October 2009.41
D.

Borrower Bankruptcies

A primary concern identified in the 1997 Note related to
bankruptcy: (1) the risk that assets securitized by an issuer would be
reclaimed in the event the issuer filed for bankruptcy, or (2) creditors of
the bankrupt issuer would not have access to the securitized assets.42 The
risks posed by an issuer bankruptcy did not become an issue for CMBS
transactions in the wake of the financial crisis. However, an unforeseen
issue was the ability of borrowers to restructure loans in bankruptcy.
Several examples emerged, which are likely to have a more lasting impact
on CMBS.
Securitization exists to finance assets separate and apart from the
risks and creditworthiness of any other entity involved in the assets.43
This isolation of risk is achieved by relying on two bedrock legal
concepts: (1) a true sale of the assets, and (2) the formation of a separate
Susan M. Wachter, The Commercial Real Estate Bubble, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83 (2013),
http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/HLB108_crop.pdf (finding that B-piece
buyers were buying conduit exposure with the intent to sell into CDOs).
40. Using a hypothetical example, a buyer purchasing a B-piece at a price equating to an
18% yield would recoup the full investment before six years. Bondholders investing in the
10-year classes of the deal, who are theoretically more senior in the priority of payments,
would depend on loans repaying over the entire 10-year deal term for a full recovery of
principal.
41. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., Moody’s/REAL Commercial Property Price Indices,
December 2009 (Dec. 21, 2009).
42. Kronovet, supra note 1, at 311.
43. Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security 25
CARDOZO L. REV. (2004); University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 55 at
1662, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334831 (The principal value of securitization flows from the
separation of risks of the assets from those of the originator). Securitization lowers the
financing costs for borrowers and originators of loans by avoiding the costs imposed by the
Bankruptcy Code on the secured creditors of operating companies.
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legal entity to hold the assets for the benefit of investors.44 Assets are
held in a special purpose entity (“SPE”) with the express intent of
eliminating the risk of a bankruptcy filing by this entity or the risk of
entangling the securitized assets in a parent company’s bankruptcy. The
purpose of this structure is summed up with the commonly used term,
“bankruptcy remote entity.”45
This isolation of corporate risk from asset risk has been credited
with creating liquid tradable instruments out of illiquid assets, lowering
financing costs for issuers, and opening avenues to more efficient asset
allocation for investors.46 And yet, even though vast sums of capital are
committed in reliance on the legal principles underlying securitization,47
the separation of securitized assets has not been consistently upheld in

44. A true sale is a vital in distinguishing the securitization from a loan, “This separation
is achieved by structuring the sale of assets between the transferor and the SPE as a “true sale”
between the parties rather than a transfer of the security interest in the assets. “In a
securitizations true sale, the originator must absolutely assign, transfer, and divest of all
ownership rights, title, or interest in its assets to the SPV. John A. Pearce & Ilya A. Lipin,
Special Purpose Vehicles in Bankruptcy Litigation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 197 (2011) (citing
Lasalle Nat’l Bank v. Paloian. 406 B.R. 299 (7th Cir. Ill. 2010)).
45. “The special-purpose corporation is designed to make remote the possibility that it
would enter bankruptcy, either by itself or by substantive consolidation into a bankruptcy of
its parent should that occur.” FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 140, App’x A. § 83(c). In order to achieve this risk
management objective, SPE organizational documents typically have three fundamental
characteristics: (1) such documents limit the SPE’s objects and powers, (2) such documents
create structural obstacles to the SPE’s filing for bankruptcy for reasons not related to the
financial condition of the project, typically requiring the consent of directors or managers of
the SPE who are independent of the sponsor, and (3) reinforced by the credit documents, such
organizational documents impose separateness covenants that limit bankruptcy risk by
generally requiring the SPE to operate as a stand-alone entity and limiting the SPE’s ability
to incur obligations unrelated to the securitized financing. COMM. ON STRUCTURED FIN. OF
THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., STRUCTURING COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE
SECURITIZATION SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES AFTER GENERAL GROWTH PROPERTIES, (July
2010),
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071978StructuringCommercialMortgageSecuritizations.pdf
46. Edward L. Glaeser, Debating the Securitization of Mortgages, THE N.Y. TIMES (July
27, 2010) http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/debating-the-securitization-ofmortgages/?_r=0 (describing some of the benefits of securitization and its role in helping the
current economy); Securitisation It’s Back, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21593457-once-cause-financial-worlds-problemssecuritisation-now-part-solution-its.
47. Issuers of asset-backed securities (securitization) financed non-mortgage business
and consumer loans of $1.39 trillion at year-end 2015. SEC. INDUST. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N,
STATISTICAL RELEASE, U.S. ABS ISSUANCE AND OUTSTANDING. Securitizations of singlefamily mortgages amounted to $7.08 trillion. SEC. INDUST. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N,
STATISTICAL RELEASE, U.S. MORTGAGE-RELATED ISSUANCE AND OUTSTANDING. Of most
relevance here, securitization financed $582.8 billion of commercial mortgages. (Id.)

82

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 20

court.48 Long before the financial crisis, LTV Steel served as the leading
case illustrating the broad powers of bankruptcy courts under section 105
of the Bankruptcy Code49 and defining the estate of the debtor under
section 541.50 In LTV Steel, the court allowed a bankrupt debtor access
to the cash collateral held by two securitization SPEs and included those
non-filing entities in the bankruptcy estate.51 The LTV Steel case
foreshadowed challenges that would face the CMBS market starting in
2009.
From the fallout from the 2008 financial crisis came three
bankruptcy cases, filed in short succession, of lasting significance to
CMBS: General Growth Properties52 and Extended Stay53 in 2009,
followed a year later by Innkeepers.54 These three cases brought into
direct conflict the broad powers of bankruptcy courts with the asset
isolation measures central to the securitization process. The ability of
debtors to include “bankruptcy remote” SPEs in their bankruptcy estates,
to access securitization cash flow to fund their re-organizations, and their
success in modifying the terms of their securitized loans undermined core
tenets of CMBS.
1. General Growth Properties
Facing the prospect of upcoming loan maturities amid a CMBS
market that had seen no new deals issued since 2008, General Growth
Properties, Inc. (“GGP”), a shopping center operator, filed a voluntary
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on April 16, 2009.55 The bankruptcy
48. In re LTV Steel Co. 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (exemplifying the
unwillingness by courts to consistently uphold the separation of securitized assets prior to the
financial crisis).
49. Samantha J. Rothman, Lessons From General Growth Properties: The Future of the
Special Purpose Entity, 17 FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 227, 235–36.
50. In re LTV Steel Co. 275 B.R. 278, 285–86 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (finding assets
of subsidiaries to be part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate).
51. John A. Pearce II and Ilya A. Lipin, Special Purpose Vehicles in Bankruptcy
Litigation, 40 Hofstra L. Rev. 177, 204 (“The LTV case demonstrates that despite financially
damaging effects for the SPV’s investors, a bankruptcy court may allow the parent-originator
to use liquid assets it previously sold to a bankruptcy-remote SPV to prevent negative
consequences that the originator’s bankruptcy would have on its employees, retirees and
regional economics.”)
52. In re Gen. Growth Properties, Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
53. In re Extended Stay Inc., 435 B.R. 139, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
54. In re Innkeepers USA Trust, 448 B.R. 131, 138 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
55. In re Gen. Growth Properties, Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). GGP’s
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filing was significant to the CMBS market because at the time of its filing
GGP was the second largest mall operator in the United States and the
largest borrower in the CMBS market with loans securitized in many
deals.56 Along with its bankruptcy filing, GGP also caused 160 propertyowning SPE CMBS borrowers to file voluntary Chapter 11 petitions. The
bankruptcy for GGP and the SPEs became jointly administrated.
CMBS investors, represented by special servicers, clashed with
GGP on three fronts during the bankruptcy: (1) Investors argued that
certain CMBS properties should not have been included in the bankruptcy
in the first place; (2) CMBS investors disputed the company’s ability to
use cash flow from SPEs during the pendency of its reorganization; and
(3) Investors were dealt restructured terms that extended loan maturities
and waived prepayment penalties.
A group of lenders sought to dismiss the bankruptcy filings of
certain SPEs asserting that the bankruptcy filings of these entities were
made in “bad faith”.57 The lenders argued, in essence, that these GGP
SPEs were not properly the subject of a Chapter 11 reorganization
because the SPEs were not in financial distress. In support of an assertion
of “bad faith”, the lenders relied on two facts: (1) GGP had replaced
independent mangers of many SPEs immediately before filing for
bankruptcy with appointees that would not oppose bankruptcy,58 and (2)
GGP failed to negotiate with the SPE lenders before filing for
bankruptcy.59 The court denied the motions to dismiss, finding the
actions of GGP did not constitute bad faith. The court further concluded
that as directors of a Delaware corporation, the independent directors had
business model relied on continued access to the capital markets to refinance property loans.
Id. at 53. At the time of its filing, GGP financed $15.0 billion of its $27.3 billion in prepetition
debt through CMBS. The company cited the lack of financing in the CMBS market as
precipitating the need to file for bankruptcy. As additional context, hedge fund Pershing
Square Capital Management disclosed that it had acquired a 7.4% stake in the company in
January 2009. GGP’s bankruptcy filing may have been somewhat opportunistic, citing debt
maturities three years into the future.
56. The company’s business model relied on access to mortgage capital, primarily
CMBS, to refinance maturing debt, and $18.27 billion of its $27.3 billion in prepetition debt
had been financed in the form of secured borrowings from property-owning SPEs.
57. Motion of ING Clarion Capital Loan Services LLC, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b),
to Dismiss the Cases of Bakersfield Mall LLC; RASCCAP Realty, Ltd.; Visalia Mall, L.P.;
GGP-Tucson Mall L.L.C.; Lancaster Trust; HO Retail Properties II Limited Partnership; RS
Properties Inc.; Stonestown Shopping Center L.P.; and Fashion Place, LLC (In re General
Growth Properties, Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
58. In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. 43, 49–51, 63–65 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
59. Id. at 37–38.
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a duty to act in the interest of the corporation (i.e., the SPE) and its
shareholders (i.e., GGP),60 and therefore acted appropriately in placing
the SPEs in bankruptcy.
GGP also came into conflict with CMBS investors over the use
of property cash flow during the pendency of the bankruptcy. Loan
documents provided that cash flow from properties would be deposited
into lender-controlled accounts in the event of a borrower default such as
a bankruptcy filing.61 GGP sought the court’s permission to override
these “lock-box” provisions and instead continue to direct property cash
flow into the parent company’s accounts as had been the practice prior to
the bankruptcy filing. The company’s cash management would adversely
affect the SPEs security and would violate the separateness covenants.
The bankruptcy court granted GGP access to cash collateral but also
granted the SPE lenders (the various CMBS Trusts) an adequate
protection lien on GGP’s main operating account and on intercompany
loans, which evidenced the upstream flow of cash.62 In practical terms,
the court order meant cash collateral from the individually-created SPEs
could be used for purposes unrelated to the specific SPEs that generated
the cash flows.
The GGP bankruptcy was also significant because the company
succeeded in modifying the terms of its CMBS loans—with no objections
from creditors by this point.63 Restructured loan terms generally included
maturity date extensions, the waiver of limitations on loan prepayments,
and, in some instances, the suspension of principal payments.64

60. Id. at 68.
61. Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 759,

804 (2013) (“[T]hese rents constituted the secured creditors’ cash collateral.”).
62. J. Eric Ivester et al., Using the Chapter 11 Process to Restructure REITs, SKADDEN,
ARPS,
SLATE,
MEAGHER
&
FLOM
LLP
(May
2010),
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/REIT_CMBS_Restructurings_in_a
_Chapter_11_Environment.pdf; see also James Gadsden, General Growth Properties and Its
Aftermath, Hot Topics In Structured Finance, CARTER LEDYARD & MILBURN LLP (Mar.
2010), http://www.clm.com/docs/6557479_3.pdf.
63. Dick, supra note 61, at 808 (“With the SPEs safely in bankruptcy and GGP authorized
to use the SPEs’ rental income, SPE creditors were highly incentivized to agree to a
restructuring of the mortgage loans.”).
64. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., No. 09-11977, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 5943 (U.S. Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2010)
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2. Extended Stay
Two months after the GGP filing, Extended Stay, Inc. (“ESH”),
a large limited-service hotel operator, filed for bankruptcy, again bringing
“bankruptcy remote” property owning entities into court with the
corporate parent.65 The purchase of the ESH hotel chain two years earlier
had been financed by $7.4 billion in debt consisting of a $4.1 billion in
CMBS debt, and $3.3 billion of mezzanine loans.
At origination, the CMBS loan had been structured with
extensive special purpose entity and separateness representations and
covenants.66 While these measures did not keep the CMBS debt out of
the bankruptcy court, a personal guaranty executed against the principal
of the borrower under the CMBS loan was upheld.67 At structuring, the
loan included a $100 million personal guaranty by David Lichtenstein
that would be triggered if the company filed for bankruptcy. Ultimately,
the restructuring resulted in the sale of the hotel chain to two private
equity firms. The transaction was accomplished by refinancing the
CMBS debt and extinguishing the $3.3 billion of mezzanine debt.68
3. Innkeepers
As the Extended Stay case was moving to a final plan
confirmation in July 2010, Innkeepers USA filed for bankruptcy. Similar
to ESH, Innkeepers was a large hotel chain that relied on the CMBS
market to help finance a 2007 leveraged buyout. As with GGP and ESH,
the Innkeepers bankruptcy was to be financed with cash collateral from
the property SPEs. All property cash flow was commingled and applied
to a waterfall that paid operating expenses, corporate overhead,
bankruptcy professional fees, and debtor-in-possession financing ahead
of CMBS debt, while the CMBS creditors were granted adequate
protection.

65. In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
66. In re Extended Stay, Inc., No. 09-13764 (JMP), Report of Ralph Mabely as examiner,

73 (2010) (summarizing 13 such requirements citing to the Mortgage Loan Agreement and
Mezzanine Loan Agreements).
67. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Lightstone Holdings, LLC, 2011 NY Slip Op 51702(U), 938
N.Y.S.2d 225 (Sup. Ct. 2011).
68. Edward L. Shugrue III, Extended Stay America-Back to the Future, 16 CRE FIN.
WORLD (2014), http://www.talmagellc.com/pdfs/ESA-Back_to_the_Future_Article.pdf.

86

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 20

Bankruptcy for Innkeepers eventually meant a restructuring of
the CMBS debt held across a number of different trusts. For example,
the largest CMBS loan, an $825.4 million original balance fixed-rate
loan, saw its balance reduced by 12% while principal payments were
deferred, and the prepayment penalties were waived. The case created
precedent for the proposition that individual CMBS investors do not have
standing to sue, with the exceptions of certain contractually prescribed
provisions set forth in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”),69
as they ceded that right to the special servicer pursuant to the terms of the
PSA.70
IV. POST-CRISIS MARKET REGULATION AND THE OUTLOOK FOR CMBS
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) became the central legislative response to
the 2008 financial crisis.71 While sweeping in scope, Dodd-Frank
focused on securitization as the target of legislative and regulatory
attention.
Among its key securitization objectives, Dodd-Frank
addressed the alignment of interests between issuers and investors,
broadened the information disclosed to investors, and tightened oversight
of the bond ratings process. Flowing from Dodd-Frank and the U.S.
implementation of the Basel III capital framework, trading in CMBS has
also become subject to more regulatory oversight and higher capital costs.
The risk retention component, or “skin in the game” provisions,
of Dodd-Frank make up the law’s most significant securitization reform.
The law required regulatory agencies to draft a rule requiring that the
sponsor of a securitization retain a 5% loss exposed interest in the credit
risk of any asset transferred to a securitization.
While Congress created a legislative framework for securitization
reform, Dodd-Frank left significant gaps to be filled through

69. Amy Loftsgordon, Understanding Basic Mortgage Transactions and Securitized
Loans, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-pooling-servicing-agreementpsa-the-mortgage-industry.html.
70. In Brief: CMBS Certificate Holders Lack Standing In Chapter 11, Business
Restructuring Review, JONES DAY. http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/b21339e20f69-4be2-8a85-3716d3492f5c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6009672a-9045-47aaaa29-3a2a28fbe8fc/BRR_May_June_11.pdf
71. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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administrative agency rulemaking.72 The risk retention component of the
rule involved six regulatory agencies, and took more than three years to
move through the notice and comment process.73 The finalized rule
applies to deals issued after December 24, 2016, some six years after the
passage of its enabling legislation.
Within this mandate, the Dodd-Frank statute instructed agencies
to take into consideration the “B-piece” construct already in place in the
CMBS market by allowing a third-party B-piece buyer to serve as a
substitute for the CMBS issuer’s risk retention obligation. Under the
implementing rule, where this option is used, the B-piece buyer would be
subject to a five-year minimum holding period, limitations on financing
the B-piece, and other restrictions on selling and hedging its interest. By
requiring permanent, at-risk capital be maintained in each deal, the risk
retention rule promises to transform the “originate-to-sell” business
model on which the CMBS market has historically operated.
In addition to targeting the alignment of incentives through risk
retention, Dodd-Frank seeks to make more information available to
investors. The law serves this end through a number of provisions which
include: required detailed periodic asset-level disclosures under Section
942(b);74 disclosure detailing an issuer’s pre-securitization asset review
process under Section 945;75 disclosure of loan repurchase requests under
Section 943;76 and a summary to be provided by the rating agencies
describing how the representations, warranties, and enforcement
mechanisms in a particular deal differ from other similar issuances also
under Section 943.77
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) Regulation
72. Richard A. Epstein, Government by Waiver, 7 NAT’L AFF. 39 (2011) (“The 848-page
law creates a host of new regulatory agencies and powers to oversee the financial industry.
Addressed to a sector of the economy in which clear and predictable rules are especially
important, the law is astonishingly vague and broad, leaving regulators — including new
agencies with no experience or track record — with unprecedented freedom to draw up the
rules.”)
73. Credit Risk Retention, Exchange Act Release No. 34-73407, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,602
(Dec. 24, 2014) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 267).
74. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
942(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c) (2014).
75. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
945, 12 U.S.C. § 77g(d) (2014).
76. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
943, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2014).
77. Id.
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AB II (“Reg AB”) does the heavy lifting in terms of implementing DoddFrank’s securitization investor reporting mandates.78 The rule sets out
standardized asset-level disclosures to be filed at the time of the
securitization and on an ongoing basis. Along with these required
disclosures, the rule also inserts more time into the deal marketing
process, presumably to allow investors additional time to perform due
diligence.79 Reg AB also requires the chief executive officer of the
depositor to make a certification as to the veracity of the disclosures in
the prospectus. Reg AB further mandates the appointment of an asset
reviewer that polices compliance with the representations and warranties
made by the loan originator at issuance.80 The bulk of these provisions
went into effect in November 2015, while the asset disclosure provisions
take effect in November 2016. Pre-dating Reg AB, the pre-existing
standard for CMBS reporting has been the CRE Finance Council’s
Investor Reporting Package, which is the work product of a long-term
collaborative effort between investors, issuers, servicers, and other
market participants.
Dodd-Frank proceeds along two fronts to reform the bond rating
system. First, the law targets the rating process directly by imposing
requirements for expanded information disclosure, heightened liability,
and closer SEC oversight.81 The information provided to rating agencies
by servicers must follow the specific protocols established in § 17(g)-5.
The purpose of this reform is to ensure that all rating agencies interested

78. Reg AB was originally adopted in 2004. The SEC initiated an update of the rule
through an NPR in April 2014. The SEC then re-proposed revisions to the rule in July 2011
after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, and adopted the final rule in Aug. 2014. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n., Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, Exchange Act Release
Nos. 33-9638, (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/33-9638.pdf.
79. The rule does this by requiring the delivery of a preliminary prospectus at least three
days prior to pricing and the filing of a prospectus supplement disclosing any material changes
at least 48 hours before pricing. The rule allows for more communication and coordination
between bondholders.
80. The Second Circuit has thrown a spanner into the works with its decision in Ace
Securities v. DB Structured products, which applies the New York statute of limitations period
of six years to rep and warranty repurchase claims. In the current state of play, the asset
reviewer may have a mandate to review rep and warranty breaches late in the deal life when
there may no longer be a legally valid claim for enforcement. ACE Sec. Corp., etc. v. DB
Structured Prods., Inc., 2014 NY Slip Op 76202, 2014 N.Y. LEXIS 1406, 23 N.Y.3d 906
(2014).
81. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING
ORGANIZATIONS, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 34-72936, (Nov. 14, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/34-72936.pdf.
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in evaluating a securitization have equal access to information to perform
their analysis and assign a rating. The second reform made in DoddFrank, through Section 939A, ordered that references to credit ratings be
removed from all federal regulation. The primary effect has been to
eliminate the reliance on ratings for purposes of determining bank
regulatory capital.82
In addition to deal structure, investor reporting, and ratings, bond
trading became the subject of regulatory reform. Here, three rules come
into play. The Volcker Rule, § 619 of Dodd-Frank, prohibits banks from
engaging in proprietary trading, meaning trading purely for short-term
profit in the bank’s own accounts.83 While in principle the rule sounds
straightforward, as implemented it is less so, and relies on subjective
metrics such as an estimate of expected near-term investor demand in a
particular security. Bank capital rules have been revised to raise the
capital costs associated with holding higher-risk securitization
exposures.84 Finally, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority is
moving forward with plans to require the disclosure of more information
on individual CMBS trades.85
V. CONCLUSION
Given the breadth of the regulations that have attached to the
CMBS market since the financial crisis, the cumulative impact may not
be apparent for some time. On the whole, it is reasonable to expect costs
and frictions to securitizations to increase. On the other hand, competing
sources of funding to commercial real estate are not affected by these
rules. An insurance company, for example, does not face the same
heightened constraints on underwriting a commercial real estate
mortgage for its own balance sheet.

82. Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 749
(Apr. 2013), http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Manns.pdf.
83. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2014).
84. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Market Risk. Fed. Reg. Vol. 78, No. 243 (codified at
12 CFR 325)
https://www.fdic.gov/news/board/2012/2012-06-12_notice_dis-a.pdf
85. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE, TRADE REPORTING AND COMPLIANCE
ENGINE, (Feb. 9, 2015) (comment period expired Apr. 10, 2015),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Notice_Regulatory_15-04.pdf.
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Therefore, as the post-crisis regulations come into effect, CMBS
will likely cede market share of the commercial mortgage market to other
sources of capital, including banks, life insurance companies, and Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. The extent to which these regulations diminish
the role of CMBS will not be fully evident for years. That said, the
innovative spirit that marked the development of CMBS to date is not to
be counted out.

